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ABSTRACT
This research introduced two new scales for the identification and measurement
of negative sentiment and insider risk in communications in order to examine
the unexplored relationship between these two constructs. The inter-rater
reliability and criterion validity of the Scale of Negativity in Texts (SNIT) and
the Scale of Insider Risk in Digital Communications (SIRDC) were established
with a random sample of email from the Enron archive and criterion measures
from established insiders, disgruntled employees, suicidal, depressed, angry,
anxious, and other sampled groups. In addition, the sensitivity of the scales to
changes over time as the risk of digital attack increased and transitioned to a
physical attack was also examined in an actual case study. Inter-rater reliability
for the SNIT was extremely high across groups while the SIRDC produced
lower, but acceptable levels of agreement. Both measures also significantly
distinguished the criterion groups from the overall Enron sample. The scales
were then used to measure the frequency of negative sentiment and insider risk
indicators in the random Enron sample and the relationship between the two
constructs. While low levels of negative sentiment were found in 20% of the
sample, moderate and high levels of negative sentiment were extremely rare,
occurring in less than 1% of communications. Less than 4% of the sampled
emails displayed indicators of insider risk on the SIRDC. Emails containing high
levels of insider risk comprised less than one percent or the sample. Of the emails
containing negative sentiment in the sample, only 16.3%, also displayed
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indicators of insider risk. The odds of a communication containing insider risk
increased with the level of negative sentiment and only low levels of insider risk
were found at low levels of negative sentiment. All of the emails found to contain
insider risk indicators on the SIRDC also displayed some level of negative
sentiment. The implications of these findings for insider risk detection were then
examined.
1. INTRODUCTION
News reports continually feature insider episodes including acts of workplace
violence, espionage, sabotage, theft of intellectual property, harassment,
violations of financial rules and leaks of sensitive information by employees or
other insiders. Recent research on the relatively low frequency of organizational
reporting of many classes of non-violent insider offenses to law enforcement
indicates that these public cases are only the tip of the insider iceberg (Computer
Security Institute [2011] 15th Annual Computer Security Institute 2010/2011
Survey, CSI www.GoCSI.com). Whether public or private, digital
communications frequently form the core of investigative leads and evidence in
insider cases. All too often, as in the recent cases of the Boston Marathon
bombers (The New York Times, 2013), and other dangerous insiders (e.g.,
Pittsburgh gym killer George Sodini [The Telegraph, 2009], accused anthrax
killer Bruce Ivins [Expert Behavioral Analysis Panel, 2010], etc.), investigators
find that the writing was on the virtual wall in terms of the warning signs of
insider risk discovered. While there are many available approaches for detecting
and analyzing technical anomalies indicative of insider risks related to theft of
intellectual property, espionage, leaks, and fraud (unusual copying, use of
prohibited memory devices, etc.), there are few tools for detecting content
indicative of insider risk in digital communications. Improved detection and
assessment of risk indicators in content might facilitate more effective
investigation, prevention, and management of insider and other problems by
helping investigators prioritize leads based on technical detection signals and
assigning priority to individuals who are also disgruntled. In addition, human
scales that measure risk can serve as a valuable benchmark for computerized risk
assessment detection approaches.
Such improvements in online risk detection tools seem particularly important as
more of our lives have moved from face-to-face and telephonic communication
to online exchanges. In addition, research on the lack of coworker and supervisor
reporting of observed risk indicators indicates that security awareness programs
seeking to increase such reports are facing significant cultural obstacles (Wood
and Marshall-Mies, 2003).

40

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 8(1)
1.1 Negative Sentiment and Insider Risk
Employee frustration and anger have long been associated with aggression and
violence in the workplace (Glomb and Liao, 2003; Hershcovis et al., 2007;
Hershcovis and Barling, 2010), as well as turnover, absenteeism, accidents on
the job, alcohol consumption, and other high-risk health behaviors (O’Neil et.
al. 2009). Holton (2009) also found an association between anger and fraud, and
Band and colleagues (Band et al., 2006) found similar links to sabotage and
espionage. Occupational health researchers who study a range of counterproductive work behaviors (CWBs), from taking long lunches to workplace
violence, have consistently found a strong link between negative emotions and
CWBs (Brief and Weiss, 2002; Dalal, 2005; Sakurai and Jex, 2012; Schat and
Kelloway, 2005).
However, not all forms of anger or negative sentiment pose a risk of such
counter-productive behavior. For example, Averill (1983) estimated that only
around 10% of incidents involving anger result in aggressive or violent
outcomes. Occupational health researchers surveying large groups of employees
for the presence and frequency of CWBs routinely note such contributing factors
as individual baseline anger (trait negative affectivity), job type, and job
autonomy, all of which can contribute to negative sentiment without increasing
the risk of CWBs. In addition, occupational health researchers have found that
other factors, such as social and supervisor support, can mediate the link between
negative emotions and CWBs (Sakurai and Jex, 2012). These researchers have
also documented a range of possible employee reactions to negative emotions
that may substitute for insider acts, including withdrawal, avoidance, regulation
of negative emotion through diet, smoking, exercise, or leaving the workplace.
Clearly, an individual’s disposition, job stress, freedom to react to stress, and
previous experience can set the stage for his reactivity to perceived aversive
stimuli and modify the likelihood of CWBs. There are also probably few
organizations where some form of negative sentiment regarding working
conditions or related issues is not part of the background “noise” in employee
communications.
Thus, the use of anger or negative sentiment alone, or the routine use of low
levels of negative sentiment as an indicator of insider risk or other CWBs may
result in false positive reports, distracting attention from more serious cases.
Based on their workplace data, Calhoun and Weston (2008) have argued that
authors expressing disgruntlement and even threats (so-called “Howlers”) may
be at much less risk for actual attacks than those who more carefully plan without
any form of expressed warning (so called “Hunters”).
There is also a strong ethical and scientific tradition in clinical psychology test
development of ensuring that clinical measures are highly specific in their ability
to identify criterion groups of concern, versus false positives. Thus, measures of
depression, anti-social behavior, or attention deficit disorders should identify at
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least 80% of persons with these syndromes in clinical samples and differentiate
them from persons who do not have these disorders. Similarly, effective
detection tools for insider risk should, theoretically, be able to differentiate
persons with negative sentiment who do and do not pose a threat of insider
activity. While we have not yet achieved this level of diagnostic specificity or
selectivity, the deployment of both a rating scale for negative sentiment and a
separate scale for insider risk will allow improved investigation of the
relationship between these two phenomena and help us better understand areas
of overlap and independence between the constructs. This area is so unexplored
that we do not know the answer to such basic questions as: (1) What is the
frequency of communication with negative sentiment or insider risk in a random
sample of organizational emails? (2) What percentage of digital communications
with significant negative sentiment also contains insider risk indicators? (3)
What percentage of messages associated with demonstrated insider risk also
contain negative sentiment? (4) Are particular types of negative sentiment more
likely to be associated with different types of insider risk such as violence,
espionage, leaks, fraud, or theft of intellectual property? Without separate rating
scales for these two phenomena these issues have been difficult to address
empirically.
Currently, there are no published, validated, specialized rating scales for the
detection and measurement of negative sentiment in communications for use by
analysts of insider risk and investigators of insider violations. While on the
surface, the detection of negative sentiment may seem a rather straight-forward
pursuit, there are so many ways in which individuals can express negative
feelings and judgments without the use of overtly negative terms that the
detection and rating of negative expressions can actually be quite complicated.
A validated measurement system for use by analysts and investigators might
eliminate threats to reliability derived from subjective “expert” or other human
judgments, buttress the credibility of these judgments with empirical support,
improve analyst detection rates, sensitize analysts to changes over time that
might signal increased risk, and help investigators narrow a field of suspects
according to objectively measured levels of disgruntlement contributing to
subject motivation. Computerized, content-based risk detection methods may
always be challenged to detect the many nuanced aspects of human negative
expression such as sarcasm (“that worked out well”), irony (“you got as good
as you gave”) and even non-negative forms of negative expression such as
protest (“I’ve always done my best for the Company”). Human-based coding
schemes that capture these more subtle forms of negative emotion will provide
a critical benchmark for these particularly challenging tasks. Even if the
proposed scales prove more useful in research than in applied evaluations and
investigations, familiarity with these measures might still improve analyst and
investigator sensitivity, as well as coworker reporting.
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To address some of these gaps in the literature, this paper describes two
observational scales designed to detect and measure levels of negative sentiment
and insider risk, respectively, within digital or other content. The derivation of
these scales, their inter-rater reliability, and their performance with criterion
groups are presented. Scale results with a random sample of employee
communications from the Enron archive combined with a random sample of
established insider communications are also examined to shed light on the
unexplored relationship between negative sentiment and insider risk in digital
communications.
The balance of this paper describes the Scale of Negativity in Text (SNIT) and
the Scale of Insider Risk in Digital Communication (SIRDC), as well as the
research design and results obtained from tests of their inter-rater reliability and
performance with criterion groups. The SNIT and SIRDC results are then
explored to address the relationship between expressed negative sentiment and
insider risk.
2. DETECTING AND MEASURING NEGATIVE SENTIMENT AND
INSIDER RISK
2.1 Description of the SNIT and SIRDC
2.1.1 The Scale for Negativity in Text (SNIT)
The Scale for Negativity in Text was designed to help researchers and
investigators detect and score the frequency of negative feelings and attitudes in
communication. While the SNIT codes straight-forward judgments and feelings
with negative connotations, it was also designed to detect and score more subtle
and complex forms of expression communicating negativity. For example, the
SNIT identifies and codes the frequency of negative judgments and feelings, as
well as terms that add emphasis or power to these sentiments. So, in the example
“I deeply resent your intrusion,” “resent” would be coded as a negative feeling,
and “deeply” would be scored as an adverbial intensifier—a term that increases
the power of the feeling of resentment (Weintraub, 1981, 1989). Other nonverbal intensifiers may include exclamation marks, underlining, emoticons, or
other “non-verbal” forms of emphasis. In addition, “your intrusion” would be
coded as a direct accusation, criticism, or attack against a specific individual or
group. Other examples of direct negative sentiment scored by the SNIT include
statements of opposition or negation (“I won’t do that”) (Weintraub, 1981,
1989), direct and indirect threats, use of curses, foul language or other slurs,
dehumanizing sexual material, sarcasm, rhetorical questions or negative irony,
negative religious or ethnic attacks, and provocations or taunts.
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The SNIT also identifies and scores more subtle and complex expressions of
negative sentiment, including appeals, pleas, requests, or demands that
communicate author discomfort without expressing overt negativity. For
example, the phrase “please listen to me” does not contain any overtly negative
content but may represent a statement of author discomfort. In addition, the
SNIT identifies and scores neutral or even positive statements that imply
negativity, protest, criticism, or opposition without direct expressions of
negativity. For example, the statement “she left me” does not include any overtly
negative material, but the context can indicate author disappointment with the
event. The phrase “I have always done my best for the Company” also does not
contain any overtly negative content. However, given the appropriate context,
it could be coded by the SNIT as a non-negative statement of protest. Table 1 in
the Appendix displays these 16 SNIT categories and examples of coded terms
for each variable.
As an example from insider communication, the excerpt below was taken from
Army Private Bradley Manning’s correspondence with a hacker contact during
the period in which he was accused of leaking classified material to Wikileaks
(Hansen, 2011).
i cant believe what im confessing to you :’(ive been so isolated
so long… i just wanted to be nice, and live a normal life… but
events kept forcing me to figure out ways to survive… smart
enough to know whats going on, but helpless to do anything…
Table 1 identifies examples of terms from this passage that would be coded on
the SNIT by category.
2.1.2 The Scale of Insider Risk in Digital Communication (SIRDC)
The SIRDC contains seven components related to the detection and scoring of
insider risks, including such insider acts as violence, sabotage, espionage, IP
theft, and damaging leaks. These seven components include:







Process variables that indicate the extent to which subject behavior that
could be directly associated with, or contribute to, the accomplishment
of insider actions is present and/or increasing (preparations, rehearsals,
etc.);
Psychological State variables that indicate the extent that subject
attitudes, beliefs, and feelings are consistent with individuals who have
committed insider acts;
Personal Predisposition variables that indicate the extent to which the
subject’s observed history, experiences, personal characteristics, and
contacts mirror those of previous insider subjects;
Personal Stressors;
Professional Stressors;
44
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Concerning Behaviors, such as violations of workplace or other rules,
traditions, laws, policies, or procedures that indicate the extent to which
the subject has had difficulty controlling his behavior consistent with
expectations, in a manner similar to other insiders; and
Mitigating factors indicating that the subject’s level of insider risk may
be modified by personal or other characteristics that reduce the level of
risk.
Table 1 Examples of Terms and SNIT Code by Category

SNIT Coding for Bradley
Manning Passage by Content and
SNIT Category
Can’t
Confessing
So
isolated
So
long
:
…
just
wanted to be nice
live a normal life
…
But
forcing me
figure out ways to survive
…
But
helpless
anything

SNIT Category Scored
Negation or Opposition Statement
Non-Negative negative
Adverbial intensifier
Negative feeling
Adverbial intensifier
Non-negative Negative
Non-verbal emphasis
Non-verbal emphasis
Adverbial intensifier
Non-negative negative
Non-negative negative
Non-Verbal emphasis
Negation/Opposition
Negative Evaluator
Non-negative negative
Non-Verbal emphasis
Negation/Opposition
Negative feeling
Adverbial intensifier

2.1.2.1 Process Variables: In the area of violence prediction, the Association of
Threat Assessment Professionals (ATAP, 2006) lists process variables as threat
indicators that suggest that a subject is actually approaching an act of violence.
Variables such as evidence of escalation, attack rehearsal, actual attack
preparations, and weapon acquisition are included in this category (ATAP, 2006,
p. 7). The SIRDC includes many of these variables as predictive of increased
violence risk but also utilizes these process measures more broadly to denote
other types of insider attack preparations. For example, a subject in an angry or
violent state of mind is more likely to act on his rage, but the type of action he
or she chooses may be better predicted from his or her personality, experience,
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and access to tools that can facilitate his destructive goals. Subject fantasies
about insider acts, rehearsal, and feelings that other options are not available also
carry over from violence to broader insider act predictors on the SIRDC. In
addition, some extreme states of mind associated with violence also are included
as broader insider risk predictors, such as suicidal thoughts, a loss of cognitive
control or inhibitions due to substance abuse or other factors, and
depersonalization of a potential target, making it easier to attack.
2.1.2.2 At-Risk Psychological States: The next section of the SIRDC includes
at-risk psychological states that may not be as extreme as those cited above, but
that refer to explicit impairments of rational thought that have been associated
with insider actions. These states of mind include content indicators of:








Suspiciousness,
Accusations,
Victimization,
Excessive Blame,
Obsession with a potential target or situation;
Rationalization of destructive actions, and
A range of injustice attributions regarding an organization and/or its
leadership.

For example, an individual who is suspicious that he is going to be terminated
due to some perceived bias against him may manifest suspicion, feelings of
victimization, blame his supervisor or other coworkers, describe perceived
injustices he attributes to organizational leaders, and rationalize his actions prior
to leaving the organization and stealing its intellectual property.
The passage below was taken from an insider who leaked proprietary
information from an organization and eventually sought extortion money to
cease his activities. It would be coded on the SIRDC for examples of injustice
attributions, suspiciousness, victimization and excessive blame.
It was not enough for government officials to destroy my
financial resources; but they also had to destroy my reputation
and violate my civil rights, including my first amendment rights,
by threatening those who associated with me. For all I have
been accused of, I should have been locked away for life. Where
was the Justice Department then? Because I have endured
multiple punishments without ever having any opportunities to
know what the charges were or even have one proceeding to
present evidence on my behalf, its payback time.
2.1.2.3 Personal Predispositions: Personal predispositions are derived from
previous research on the critical pathway travelled by insiders as they move
through a series of steps over time within their organization taking them closer
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to committing sabotage, espionage, IP theft, violence or fraud. This critical
pathway has been described by Shaw and Fischer (2005); Band and colleagues
(Band et al., 2006); Shaw, Fischer, and Rose (2009); and Shaw and Stock (2011).
Personal predispositions describe characteristics and experiences of individuals
prior to joining their organizations that, in the presence of other precipitants,
appear to make them more vulnerable to participating in insider violations.
These personal predispositions include:








Serious mental health disorders or medical conditions impacting
perception, judgment, impulsiveness and decision-making, such as
alcoholism, attention deficit disorders, anxiety disorders, depression,
etc.
Personality disorders, social skills problems and/or significant biases in
personal and professional decision-making that consistently negatively
impact personal and professional relationships producing observable,
maladaptive personal and professional behaviors.
A history of rule violations ranging from such serious conduct as
prosecuted legal violations and convictions (DWIs) to less serious
offenses such as chronic tardiness, violations of dress code or hygiene
regulations, ignoring organizational policies and practices, or other
violations of organizational protocol.
Social network risks, such as a family history of criminal activity or
membership in an adversary group, or any pre-employment (at location
from which espionage is committed) contact (face-to-face, telephone or
digital) with members of an adversarial at-risk group.

2.1.2.4 Personal Stressors: Within the critical pathway framework, personal
and professional stressors are seen as activating personal predispositions and
contributing to an increased likelihood of Concerning Behaviors and insider risk.
Personal stressors are defined as changes in personal or social responsibilities or
conditions requiring significant energy for adaptation, which do not involve
direct workplace or financial issues—including death of a family member,
marriage, divorce, births, moves, etc. These events or experiences are derived
from the Holmes-Rahe Scale of stressful life events (Holmes and Rahe, 1967).
2.1.2.5 Professional Stressors: Professional stressors include changes in
professional, school, and/or work conditions or responsibilities that require
significant energy for adaptation, exclusive of financial and personal
implications—changes in affiliation, graduation, attending a new institution or
obtaining a new job, demotion, termination, promotion, transfer, retirement,
consulting work, taking side jobs, etc. The loss or gain of income related to new
school, job, promotion, or termination is scored separately in financial stressors.
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In the Manning excerpt above, he references plans for his discharge, being
demoted from intelligence to supply duties, and his reaction to news coverage of
his alleged leaks. Both these negative and “positive” events would be coded as
professional stressors within this section.
2.1.2.6 Concerning Behaviors: Concerning Behaviors are violations of
policies, standard procedures, professional conduct, accepted practice, rules,
regulations, or law through action or inaction (failure to report), which have been
observed by managers, supervisors, coworkers, or reported to these individuals
by others. For example, failure to submit a time sheet in a timely manner,
unreported travel, misuse of expense accounts, violations of hygiene or dress,
refusal to follow supervisor instructions, going around a supervisor to a superior,
coworker or supervisor conflicts, in some settings, filing complaints or protests
against other employees or supervisors, etc. This category of variables is also
derived from work on the Critical Pathway to insider risk described above by
Shaw and Fischer (2005); Band and colleagues (Band et al., 2006); Shaw,
Fischer, and Rose (2009); and Shaw and Stock (2011).
References to the occurrence of any of the following behaviors or failures to act
are recorded as concerning behaviors including violation of accepted policies
and practices governing:









Interpersonal conduct;
Use of information technology or other technical systems;
The protection of sensitive or classified information;
Physical security;
Financial conduct;
Personnel security;
Travel rules; and
Social network contacts and affiliations.

References to mental health or addiction problems that could impact judgment
or behavior are also included in this section. In addition, other categories and
individual actions may be included tailored to the definition of “concerning” that
applies to the organization involved. As noted above, there is considerable
overlap between personal predispositions and concerning behaviors, with the
only difference in some of these categories consisting of the timing of the
behavior. Behaviors or experiences noted prior to the subject’s joining the
organization are categorized as personal predispositions (characteristics he
brought to the organization), while similar issues noted while on the job are
considered concerning behaviors.
Digital references to any of these issues are coded within the Concerning
Behavior category, including signs of conflict with others across digital media.
For example, portions of the excerpt below, taken from an insider who sabotaged
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servers at a financial institution, would be coded for such concerning behaviors
as interpersonal conflict with a supervisor and failing to follow instructions
regarding the operation of an information technology resource. Additional codes
would include professional stressors for the references to being fired, relieved of
duty, or quitting.
Until you fire me or I quit, I have to take orders from you. I’ll
sit with K after I’ve written some procedures on what he can do.
Just like he cannot have LAN supervisor password until he is a
trained LAN expert, I won’t give him Sybase ROOT access until
he has been trained to be of some minimal use. If you order me
to give him root access, then you have to permanently relieve
me of any duties on that machine. I can’t be a garbage cleaner
if someone screws up.
Examples of coded material using both the SNIT and the SIRDC are included in
the Appendix. In the next section the research design used to assess the scales’
inter-rater reliability and performance is described.
3. RESEARCH DESIGN
The first objective of this research was to assess the inter-rater reliability and
criterion group validity of the SNIT and SIRDC scales. For this purpose, two
email samples were selected at random from the full, publically available Enron
email corpus (http://www.edrm.net/projects/dataset) using Net's Random class
protocol (http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/system.random.aspx). Three
coders—a psychiatric nurse and two individuals with master’s degrees in
Political Psychology, but no advanced threat assessment or clinical
psychological training—performed the coding.
SNIT and SIRDC inter-rater reliability was first tested with 75 randomly
selected emails from the Enron email archive. The SNIT’s initial inter-rater
reliability as determined by the Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC) (Koch
& Norman, 1982) which was used due to the presence of continuous versus
nominal or ordinal data, was .975 (p≤0.05). SIRDC’s initial ICC was .862
(p≤0.05). A preliminary analysis of the SNIT scale’s subcategories showed that
four measured overlapping manifestations of negative sentiment and could be
merged and redefined to improve inter-rater reliability.
We anticipated that a relatively low proportion of Enron emails would contain
negative sentiment and insider risk. Therefore, we sought additional subjects
from criterion groups with known negative sentiment, and in some cases, insider
actions, to test scale inter-rater reliability as well as scale performance with these
more expressive and complicated subjects. For this purpose, we collected
communication samples from the following 13 sources:


Ten communications from subjects who subsequently committed insider
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attacks were randomly selected from the first author’s investigative case
archive. These were individuals who expressed themselves online prior
to or during their insider actions;
Thirteen disgruntled employees from the Enron archive who
complained, but did not subsequently take insider actions according to
Google searches of their names. These subjects were selected by a visual
scan of subject headers followed by inspection of the email from the
original Enron archive;
Seventeen time series emails from an online stalker who subsequently
attacked his target physically, taken from the first author’s case archive.
These emails were selected to assess scale sensitivity to subject changes
over time and especially any indication of heightened risk;
Five publically available emails from Bruce Ivins, who was implicated
but never tried in the 2001 Anthrax attacks, taken from a public FBI
report on the investigation (U.S. Department of Justice [2010]
Amerithrax
Investigative
Summary,
http://www.justice.gov/amerithrax/docs/amx-investigativesummary.pdf);
Ten communications selected by a clinician for representation of
depressive communication from participants in public but anonymous
online
chat
rooms
for
anxiety
and
depression
(http://www.depressionhaven.org/phpBB2/viewtopic.php?t=8397
(http://www.anxietyzone.com/index.php/board,4.0.html?PHPSESSID=
e9a40ba11ef20150e3649cc1aca3456f);
Ten communications selected by a clinician for representation of anger
from participants in a public but anonymous online chat room for anger
(http://www.anxietyzone.com/index.php/topic,31323.0.html);
Ten communications selected by a clinician for representation of
financial stress from participants in public but anonymous online chat
rooms
for
financial
stress
(http://www.indeed.com/forum/cmp/Target/target-is-bogus/t8403;
http://www.anxietyzone.com/index.php/topic,51034.0.html;
http://www.experienceproject.com/stories/Hate-Living-Paycheck-ToPaycheck/2161275);
Ten communications selected by a clinician for representation of suicide
risk from participants in public but anonymous online chat room for
suicide
risk
(http://www.yourlifeyourvoice.org/AskIt/Pages/default.aspx);
Ten communications selected by a clinician for representation of
substance abuse from participants in a public but anonymous online chat
room
for
substance
abuse
problems
(http://www.anxietyzone.com/index.php/board,13.0.html?PHPSESSID
=e9a40ba11ef20150e3649cc1aca3456f);
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Ten communications selected by a clinician as representative of
disgruntled employee communication from participants in public but
anonymous online chat rooms for disgruntled employees complaining
about
work
stress
(http://www.anxietyzone.com/index.php/topic,51034.0.html
and
http://www.experienceproject.com/stories/Hate-Living-Paycheck-ToPaycheck/2161275);
The content from an OpEd piece in the Wall Street Journal by Greg
Smith complaining about the ethical climate at Goldman Sachs as he
resigned (Smith, 2012),
Email communications from alleged US Army leaker Bradley Manning
with his hacker contact taken from public coverage of the incident
(Hansen, 2011); and
An email from U.S. Navy sailor Paul Hall, who changed his name to
Hassan Abu-Jihaad, communicating from his destroyer to an established
website sympathetic to Al Qaeda. Hall was convicted of providing
material support to terrorists in March 2008 (United States District
Court, 2009).

Although other researchers have used similar data to study disgruntled
populations (Holton, 2009), we were concerned that use of a convenience sample
of publically posted comments from individuals speaking with potential
anonymity on self-help chat boards might not generalize to content found in
organizational email. However, we were anxious to test scale performance with
self-identified criterion groups with problems known to arise in the workplace.
Subsequent criterion group materials derived from workplace communications
might improve the generalizability of this sample. To ameliorate these concerns
we included actual content from disgruntled Enron employees. Since discussing
this dilemma with personnel responsible for monitoring email content at several
government and commercial organizations, we were assured that employees are
surprisingly frank in their discussions of personal emotions and life crises and
that it would not be unusual to discover employee discussions of suicide,
financial distress, and other serious concerns while searching for references to
policy or security violations.
To assess the face and criterion validity of the scales we planned to compare the
mean results from these established groups with 1000 randomly selected emails
from the Enron archive with the hypothesis that the criterion groups would score
significantly higher on both measures. This data set was reduced to 994 emails
when duplicates were discovered. We did not make predictions regarding the
relative ranking of groups on the SNIT or the SIRDC scales due to the limited
nature of the samples and the unknown expressive characteristics of insiders
versus the other criterion groups. However, we did expect some portion of the
samples from actual insiders (including Private Manning, Bruce Ivins, Abu
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Jihaad and the Online Stalker) to score higher on the SIRDC. To address the
scales’ sensitivity to changes over time we charted the scores of the Online
Stalker in 17 emails to his intended victim leading up to, and after, his physical
attack.
To address the earlier questions regarding the frequency of negative sentiment
and insider risk indicators in organizational email we calculated the simple
percentage of subjects expressing a range of these variables. To address the
question of the proportion of subjects with different ranges of negative sentiment
that also manifested insider risk indicators, we performed a simple review of the
percentage of High, Medium and Low SNIT subjects that also manifested scores
on the SIRDC. To determine the proportion of subjects with different levels of
insider risk that did or did not also display negative sentiment, we reviewed the
distribution of SNIT scores among subjects with High and Low SIRDC scores.
4. RESULTS
Inter-rater reliability for the SNIT and SIRDC across the randomly selected
Enron subjects was .919 and .915, respectively. As noted above, this result may
have been inflated due to the low frequency of subjects manifesting negative
sentiment and insider risk and the subsequent frequency of zero scores.
However, we were encouraged that coders could agree on whether these often
subtle variables were present or absent in this sample. Inter-rater reliability
across the more complicated criterion groups averaged .969 (p≤0.05) for the
SNIT scale and .731 (p≤0.05) for the SIRDC scale.
While inter-rater reliability for the SNIT proved excellent measured against an
ICC criteria of .70, the performance of the longer and more complicated SIRDC
was less consistent among coders. Inter-rater reliability scores for four of the 13
groups performed just below the .70 criteria, indicating the need for further work
on the SIRDC scales to improve coder reliability. This may also be a product of
the lower frequency of SIRDC scores in this sample, limiting coder experience
with the scale. However, the global ICC score of .731 indicated that coder
reliability overall was acceptable.
4.1 What is the Frequency of Emails Containing Negative Sentiment in a
Randomly Selected Sample of Corporate Communication?
Table 2 below displays the frequency of emails with High, Medium, Low and
No negative sentiment as measured by the SNIT within the randomly selected
Enron email sample.
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Table 2 Distribution of negative sentiment in ENRON Sample of High,
Medium, Low, and No SNIT score groups
# Emails Per Group
and Percentage of
Total

Mean SNIT
Score

High (SNIT Score ≥31)

6 (0.6%)

44.39

Medium (SNIT Score ≥16 and ≤30)

9 (0.9%)

19.93

Low (SNIT Score ≥1 and ≤15)

207 (20.82%)

2.56

No Negative Sentiment

772 (77.67%)

0

SNIT Group

Illustrative examples of email excerpts from each category containing negative
sentiment are displayed in the Appendix. It was notable that many of the insider
risk issues captured concerned potential fraud, interpersonal conflict, litigation,
as well as organizational and interpersonal disgruntlement. As can be seen in
Table 2, while low levels of negative sentiment were common, moderate and
high levels were extremely rare in this sample, occurring in less than 1% of
communications. However, if this finding were extrapolated to the large number
of emails contained in organizational systems, this rate of discovery would be
equivalent to finding 6,000 emails high in negative sentiment within a million
email cache.
4.2 What is the Frequency of Emails Containing Insider Risk Indicators in
a Randomly Selected Sample of Corporate Email?
Table 3 below displays the distribution of insider risk indicators recorded on the
SIRDC within the randomly selected Enron email.
Table 3 Distribution of SIRDC Scores in Enron Sample
Group

Number and Percentage
of Email

Mean Group SIRDC
Score

High SIRDC (≥9)

2 (.2%)

12.3

Low SIRDC (<9)

34 (3.4%)

1.4

No SIRDC score

958 (96.4%)

0

Illustrative examples of email excerpts representative of both the High and Low
SIRDC groups are contained in the Appendix. While almost 22% of sampled
emails displayed negative sentiment, less than 4% displayed indicators of insider
risk. Emails containing high levels of insider risk according to the SIRDC
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comprised less than one percent or the cache. Although just over three percent
of emails contained low levels of SIRDC scored risk, these scores were
extremely low, as displayed in Table 3.
4.3 What Percentage of Emails Containing Negative Sentiment Also
Contain Some Level of Insider Risk Indicator?
Table 4 below displays the distribution of insider risk at different levels of
negative sentiment. Of the 994 emails in the Enron sample, 222 or 22%
contained some level of negative sentiment according to the SNIT. Of these 222,
36 or 16.3% also displayed indicators of insider risk. This finding indicates that
only a very low percent of emails with negative sentiment also contain indicators
of insider risk. However, the data in Table 5 also indicates that the odds that an
email will contain insider risk increase as the level of negative sentiment rises.
As Table 4 displays, two-thirds of the emails with high levels of negative
sentiment contained insider risk indicators, while only 13.5% of emails with low
negative sentiment contained insider risk indicators. However, the distribution
of insider risk across emails with negative sentiment does not appear to be
straightforward in this sample. As Table 6 shows, the two emails highest in
insider risk appeared in the Medium SNIT group.
Table 4 Distribution of Insider Risk across High, Medium, and Low Negative
Sentiment Groups in the Enron Sample
SNIT Group

Number of Emails with SIRDC Scores
and Percent of Total Emails in Group
with SIRDC Score

SNIT High (31 or greater) N=6

4 (all low) 66.6%

SNIT Medium (16-30) N=9

4 (2 high, 2 low) 44.4%

SNIT Low (1-15) N=207

28 (all low)13.5%

All SNIT Emails N=222

36 (16.2% of all emails in sample)

4.4 What Percentage of Emails Containing Insider Risk Content Also
Contains Some Level of Negative Sentiment?
Table 5 below examines the 36 emails from the Enron sample that contained
either high or low levels of insider risk indicators on the SIRDC to determine
how many also contained negative sentiment as measured by the SNIT. As the
table indicates, all of the emails with insider risk also contained negative
sentiment. As the mean SNIT scores show, the level of negative sentiment was
higher for the High insider risk group than for the Low risk group.
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Combined with the data displayed in Table 4, this pattern of results indicates that
overall, emails with negative sentiment are far less likely to contain insider risk
indicators, while all emails with insider risk indicators contain negative
sentiment. In addition, these results indicate that the odds of an email with
negative sentiment containing insider risk indicators increases with the level of
negative sentiment and that the level of negative sentiment found in emails with
insider risk increases as the level of insider risk increases. An important
implication of this finding is that any approach utilizing negative sentiment alone
to locate the communications of individuals at-risk for insider actions will be
handicapped by a very high, built-in, false positive rate. Another finding with
practical implications is that emails low in negative sentiment contained
exclusively low levels of insider risk. This finding may help analysts prioritize
their search for at-risk individuals by avoiding this group.
Table 5 Distribution of SNIT Scores in High and Low SIRDC Groups
SIRDC Group

Number of Emails with SNIT
Scores and (Percent of Emails
in Group with SNIT Score)

Mean SNIT
Scores

SIRDC High ≥9 N= 2

2 (100%)

26

SIRDC Low (1-9) N=34

34 (100%)

11.21

4.5 Do the SNIT and the SIRDC Successfully Differentiate Groups with
Known Levels of Negative Sentiment and Insider Risk from a Randomly
Generated Sample of Organizational Email?
As Tables 6 and 7 indicate, the SNIT and SIRDC scores for the criterion groups
were significantly different than those for the overall Enron sample.
4.6 Are the SNIT and SIRDC Sensitive to Changes over Time in an Actual
Insider as the Risk of Action Moving from Online Harassment to Physical
Assault Increased?
Figure 1 depicts changes over time in the SNIT and SIRDC scores of emails
from an online stalker to his victim. These scores were normalized for number
of words to control for email length. This harassment turned from hostile and
threatening communications to an actual assault on the victim’s car just after
Email 12 but prior to Email 13 (on Valentine’s Day). As can be seen in Figure
1, the subject’s SNIT and SIRDC scores peaked just prior to the attack and then
declined immediately afterwards. It was also informative to observe the
independence of the SNIT and SIRDC at the early stages of the case when the
communications from the stalker were emotionally distraught but not
threatening. As his frustration grew, so did the threatening nature of his email
and thus, his SIRDC score. Table 5 in the Appendix provides illustrative excerpts
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and SNIT and SIRDC values for the three emails demonstrating the SNIT’s and
SIRDC’s relative independence (emails 3 and 17) and overlap (email 12).
Table 6 Mean SNIT Scores by Criterion Groups and Enron Sample
SNIT Scores for Criterion
Groups and Enron Sample

Mean SNIT
Score

Standard
Deviation

Significance
Value p≤

Depressed Chat Participants

98.23

56.36

.001

Disgruntled with Job Chat
Participants

83.53

51.28

.001

Disgruntled Enron Employees
Email

79.64

44.25

.000

Angry Chat Participants

69.27

43.01

.001

Substance Abuse Chat Participants

64.30

38.45

.001

Suicidal Chat Participants

60.33

26.09

.000

Ten Actual Insider’s
correspondence

47.68

33.37

.002

Financial Distress Chat
Participants

38.77

38.91

.002

Five Emails from Bruce Ivins

35.87

11.23

.002

Mean for 17 emails from Online
Stalker

28.16

21.22

.000

Overall Mean for Criterion
Groups

60.58

36.42

.000

Greg Smith Op Ed Attacking
Goldman Sachs

163.0

Na

Na

Bradley Manning Disgruntled Chat
with Hacker

84.0

Na

Na

Abu Jihaad

68.67

36.02

Na

Enron 994

.98

.15

Na

56

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 8(1)
Table 7 Mean SIRDC Scores by Criterion Groups and Enron Sample
SIRDC Scores for Criterion Groups and
Enron Sample

Mean SIRDC
Score

Standard
Deviation

Significance
Value p≤

Depressed Chat Participants

25.70

14.14

.000

Disgruntled with Job Chat Participants

18.33

13.49

.002

Disgruntled Enron Employees Email

26.79

20.72

.001

Angry Chat Participants

13.13

8.07

.001

Substance Abuse Chat Participants

15.67

9.62

.001

Suicidal Chat Participants

12.67

4.72

.000

Ten Actual Insider’s correspondence

17.93

15.65

.006

Financial Distress Chat Participants

7.40

4.69

.001

Five Emails from Bruce Ivins

17.87

6.78

.004

17 emails from Online Stalker

14.04

10.74

.000

Overall Means for Criterion Groups

16.99

7.33

.000

46

Na

Bradley Manning Disgruntled Chat with
Hacker

34.0

Na

Abu Jihaad

34.67

30.66

Enron 994

.07

.55

Greg Smith Op Ed Attacking Goldman Sachs

Normalized SNIT and SIRDC
Scores As Online Stalker
Escalates to Violence

A
T
TPhysical
AAttack
C
K

Figure 1 SNIT and SIRDC Levels by Email Number (1-17)
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5. CONCLUSIONS
This preliminary research on the SNIT and SIRDC indicated that both scales
displayed acceptable levels of inter-rater reliability for a randomly selected
sample of 994 emails from the Enron archive and for a subset of at-risk criterion
subjects presenting more robust and complex forms of negative sentiment and
insider risk. The SNIT and SIRDC successfully differentiated communications
from criterion groups, including subjects self-identified as angry, depressed,
anxious, suicidal, addicted to substances, disgruntled with their employment,
struggling with financial stress, and disgruntled Enron employees, from a
randomly selected group of Enron employee communications. In addition, the
SNIT and SIRDC also differentiated the 994 Enron controls from the
communications of ten known insiders, as well as Private Bradley Manning, Dr.
Bruce Ivins, former Goldman Sachs Director Greg Smith and convicted terrorist
accomplice, former U.S. Navy sailor Paul Hall (aka Hassan Abu-Jihaad). The
SNIT and SIRDC also proved sensitive to changes over time in a case of 17
communications from a jilted online stalker to his former lover, and both SNIT
and SIRDC scores peaked just prior to this subject escalating from harassing
communications to a physical attack on the victim’s property.
This research also examined the distribution of negative sentiment and insider
risk as measured by the SNIT and SIRDC in a randomly selected sample of 994
Enron communications and the heretofore unexplored relationship between
negative sentiment and insider risk. Based on this sample from an organization
which was suffering significant stress over the time frame examined, negative
sentiment proved relatively rare, appearing in only 22% of examined emails.
Moreover, all but 1.5% of these emails containing negative sentiment scored in
the low range of the SNIT. Less than one percent of these emails contained
negative sentiment in the high range.
Communications containing insider risk measured by the SIRDC in this sample
were even more rare, with only 3.5% of emails registering any SIRDC score. Of
those 36 emails discovered, only two or 0.2% of the sample, contained high
levels of SIRDC indicators. The relatively rare occurrence of signs of negative
sentiment and insider risk indicates the importance of using samples from known
criterion groups when testing the sensitivity of human or automated systems
designed to detect negative sentiment or insider risk. Samples from naturally
occurring email caches are unlikely to contain realistic representations of desired
target groups and therefore will not test any system’s ability to detect these
communications. Test samples with only low levels of SNIT or SIRDC
communications also are unlikely to be representative of real insider
communications.
Another important theoretical and practical question examined in this research
concerned the relationship between negative sentiment and insider risk,
specifically, how frequently emails with negative sentiment also contain insider
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risk indicators. This question has significant implications for analysts and
investigators concerned with insider risk identification and assessment. In this
Enron sample, only 16.3% of emails with any level of negative sentiment also
contained any level of insider risk indicator. While the odds of discovering
insider risk in emails containing negative sentiment increased with the level of
negative sentiment, investigators using any level of negative sentiment alone to
discover communications with insider risk would appear to handicap themselves
with a significant burden of false positives. However, all of the emails scoring
in any range of the SIRDC for insider risk contained some level of negative
sentiment. Another practical finding cited above is that all of the emails with low
levels of negative sentiment that had SIRDC scores were in the low range.
Pending some evidence that low insider risk scores escalate over time,
investigators may want to prioritize their search resources against higher levels
of negative sentiment.
This finding indicates that negative sentiment is an integral part of insider risk,
as would be expected given the high rates of disgruntlement and negative
psychological states associated with those responsible for insider events.
However, more complex and sensitive paradigms than negative sentiment alone
will be required to detect insider risk without the problem of significant numbers
of false positives. This challenge will be discussed further in following articles,
where the concept of perceived Victimization as an insider risk factor is
examined.
5.1 Progress toward an At-Risk Insider Target Group
Further analysis of this data and future research will explore the characteristics
of negative sentiment associated with insider risk compared to negative
sentiment in general, as well as the other psycholinguistic markers of insider risk
that can be identified in digital communications. In the meantime, results of this
research indicate that communications with moderate-to- high levels of negative
sentiment are more likely to contain insider risk indicators than communications
with low levels of negative sentiment. It appears from a preliminary review of
our data that these high SNIT and SIRDC scores are capturing many of the
psychological conditions and manifestations of disgruntlement that have been
found to contribute to insider risk (Shaw and Stock, 2011). These at-risk cases
were easily differentiated from the more general Enron population sample and
may constitute a readily identifiable at-risk group of extreme interest to
investigators. These high-to-moderate negative sentiment communications are
also likely to contain a lower percentage of false positive leads that will
unnecessarily burden analysts and investigators.

59

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 8(1)

ACKNLOWLEDGEMENTS
****This work was supported by a grant from the U.S. Department of Defense,
however, the findings, conclusions, and opinions expressed are solely those of
the authors. We also want to acknowledge the support of readers Drs. Marcus
Rogers and Stephen Band.****
REFERENCES
Association of Threat Assessment Professionals. (2006). Risk assessment
guideline elements for violence-Considerations for assessing the risk of future
violent
behavior.
Retrieved
from
htttp://atapworldwide.org/associations/8976/files/documents/RAGE-V.pdf.
Averill, J. R. (1983). Studies on anger and aggression: Implications for theories
of emotion. American Psychologist, 38: 1145-1160.
Band, S., Cappelli, D., Fischer, L, Moore, A, and Trezciek, R. (2006).
Comparing insider IT sabotage and espionage: A model based approach.
Carnegie Mellon, NY: Technical Report, Software Engineering Institute.
Brief, A. P., and Weiss, H. M. (2003). Organizational behavior: Affect in the
workplace. Annual Review of Psychology, 53: 279-307.
Calhoun, F. and Weston, S. (2008). Threat assessment and management
strategies: Identifying the howlers and hunters. Weston CRC Press.
Computer Security Institute 2011 15th Annual Computer Security Institute
2010/2011 Survey, CSI. Retrieved from www.GoCSI.com.
Dalal, R. S. (2005). Meta-analysis of the relationship between organizational
citizenship behavior and counterproductive work behavior. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 90: 1241-1255.
Glomb, T. M., and Liao, H. (2003). Interpersonal aggression in work groups:
Social influence, reciprocal, and individual effects. Academy of Management
Journal, 46: 486-496.
Hansen, E. (2011). Manning-Lamo Chat Logs Revealed. Retrieved from
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/07/manning-lamo-logs on July 13,
2011.
Hershcovis, M. S., and Barling, J. (2010). Towards a multi-foci approach to
workplace aggression: A meta-analytic review of outcomes from different
perpetrators. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 31: 24–44. doi:
10.1002/job.621.
Hershcovis, M. S., Turner, N., Barling, J., Inness, M., LeBlanc, M. M., Arnold,
K. A., et al. (2007). Predicting workplace aggression: A meta-analysis. Journal
of Applied Psychology, 92: 228-238.
60

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 8(1)
Holton, C. (2009). Identifying disgruntled employee systems fraud risk through
text mining: A simple solution for a multi-billion dollar problem. Decisions
Support Systems, 4: 853-864.
Homles, T., Rahe, R., and Homes-Rahe. (1967). Social readjustment rating
scale. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 2.
Koch, Gary. (1982). Intraclass correlation coefficient, in Encyclopedia of
Statistical Sciences, Samuel Kotz and Norman L. Johnson, 4. New York, NY:
John Wiley & Sons. pp. 213–217.
MacLennan, R. N. (2003). Interrater reliability of police training simulations.
Canadian Journal of Police and Security Services, 1: 202-209.
O’Neil, O. A., Vandenberg, R. J., DeJoy, D. M., and Wilson, M. G. (2009).
Exploring relationships among Anger, perceived organizational support, and
workplace outcomes. Journal of Occupational Health Psychology, 3: 318-333.
Sakurai, K. and Jex, S. M. (2012). Coworker incivility and incivility targets work
effort and counterproductive work behaviors: The moderating role of supervisor
social support. Journal of Occupational Health Psychology, 17: 150-161.
Schat, A. C., and Kelloway, E. K. (2005). Workplace aggression, in Handbook
of Work Stress, Barling, J., Kelloway, K., and Frone, M, editors. Sage
Publications, p. 189-218.
Shaw, E., and Fischer, L. F. (2005). Ten tales of betrayal: The threat to corporate
infrastructures by information technology insiders analysis and observations.
Defense Personnel Security Research Center, PERSEREC. Technical Report 0513. September 2005.
Shaw, E., Fischer, L. F., and Rose, A. E. (2009). Insider risk evaluation and
audit. Technical report 9-02, Defense Personnel Security Research Center.
Shaw, E., and Stock, H. (2011). Behavioral risk indicators of malicious insider
theft of intellectual property: Misreading the writing on the wall. Symantec
Corporation,
White
Paper,
December
7,
2011.
http://investor.symantec.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=89422&p=irol-newsArticle
Smith, G. (2012). Opinion/Editorial: Why I Am Leaving Goldman Sachs. The
New York Times, March 14, 2012, page A27.
U.S. Department of Justice (2010). Amerithrax Investigative Summary.
Retrieved from http://www.justice.gov/amerithrax/docs/amx-investigativesummary.pdf.
United States District Court. (2009). District of Connecticut v. Hassan AbuJihaad. NO. 3:07CR57 .[MRK]: MEMORANDUM OF DECISION Dated at New
61

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 8(1)
Haven,
Connecticut:
March
4,
2009.
Retrieved
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/pdf/abujihaadhassan.pdf, pg. 12-20.

from

Weintraub, W. (1989). Verbal Behavior in Everyday Life. New York, NY:
Springer.
Weintraub, W. (1981). Verbal Behavior: Adaptation and Psychopathology. New
York, NY: Springer.
Wood S., and Marshall-Mies, J. C. (2003). Improving supervisor and coworker
reporting of information of security concern. Defense Personnel Security
Research Center. PERS-TR-02-3. Monterey, CA.

62

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 8(1)

APPENDIX
Table 1
Scale of Negativity In Texts (SNIT) Item Descriptions
1.

Negative Evaluators

Judgments, beliefs, attributes with negative
connotations

2.

Negative Feelings

Emotions, feelings with negative connotations

3.

Adverbial Intensifiers

Add emphasis or power to expressedSentiment—
“very,” “so,” “too.”

4.

Non-verbal emphasis

Add power or emphasis to negative content with
symbols like !, all caps, underline, numbers, etc.

5.

Negation or Opposition
Statements

Create negativity thru the addition of terms like no,
not, never, n’t, impossible, or phrases like “over my
dead body.”

6.

Sarcasm or Negative Irony

Nice try. Thanks for sharing. Couldn’t happen to a
nicer guy.

7.

Rhetorical Question

How’s that working for you? Did you think before
you spoke?

8.

A direct accusation, criticism
or attack toward a specific
individual or group.

“You don’t understand how much misery you have
caused,” “you have ruined our culture,” “I don’t
know how you can sleep at night keeping your
millions and leaving thousands without jobs.”

9.

Threats—Direct, specific and
indirect general threats that
may involve violence and nonviolent coercive threats such as
lawsuits, leaks, illicit
communications blackmail or
other “white collar” nonviolent acts.

Direct threat— “I’ll get even with you tomorrow,”
“next time I see you I’m going to rearrange your
face.” Indirect threat—lack specifics about the
target, timing or means and are more general in
nature. For example, “they’ll get what they
deserve,” “someone will take care of them.”
Coercive threats—“if you do not comply we will go
to the press or file suit in court.”

10. Use of curses, foul language,
racial, political, religious,
sexual or other slurs

Shit, asshole, whore, raghead, kike, Etc.

11. Dangerous Religious, Political,
Racial or other Beliefs

All non-believers are doomed, Mudpeople need to
be extinguished

12. Sexual Material

Score 1 point for inappropriate sexual content and
additional points for dehumanizing, objectifying
content
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13. Provocations, taunts,
challenges, dares,
confrontational command to an
individual or group.

“bring it,” “I dare you,” “You and what army,”
“Watch me.”

14. A Direct personal appeal, plea,
or address with negative
connotation indicating the
author is uncomfortable, upset
or anxious

“listen to me,” “Level with me,” “trust me,”
“believe me,” “I implore you to consider.”

15. Direct demand for recompense,
reparation, justice, or
conciliatory actions denoting
the author’s upset and assertive
or aggressive state

“after 20 years you owe me,” “who’s going to pay
for this,” “this is your responsibility to fix,” ”there
should be an accounting.”

16. Non-negative statements that
imply criticism, negativity,
protest, opposition or express
these indirectly

“good try,” “I was going to ask her out but then she
left,” “another night the same.” “but I’ve always
loved you,” “I’ve worked hard all my life,” “I’ve
done my best for the Company.”

Total
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Table 2
Overt signs of violent, angry or vengeful state of mind—references to anger or
frustration linked to violence or vengeance through some type of hostile act which
may involve violence or other insider actions. “You won’t get away with this,” “You
will pay,” “You’ve hurt so many of us—there will be an accounting.” Must have
direct or strongly implied connection to an insider act ranging from violence to leaks,
etc.
Signs of escalation of negative feeling, anger, frustration, desperation across
communications. Examples might include a communication regarding anger and
depression which subsequently moves to a threat of harm. There may be rare
occasions when escalation is apparent within communications. However, this should
be sufficiently dramatic to assure that this is not just natural venting emerging over
time within the communication and should include escalation from some type of
feeling or evaluation to some type of threatened action or fantasy rather than a slightly
more extreme feeling or criticism.
Signs of addictive behavior (alcohol, illegal drugs, prescribed medications, sexual
activity, gambling, media or game addiction, pornography) that may impact
judgment, motivation, vulnerability to compromise or impulse control.
Signs of fantasy about negative insider-related acts—“I wish I could put you in my
place,” “I wonder what it would be like to shut you down,” “I wonder how long you
would last if the public knew how you really operate.”
Signs of suicidal or self-destructive thoughts or feelings—references to suicidal
mood, plans (resignation regarding doom or inevitability of suicide). Pay attention to
references to aggressive actions that may result in suicide through others such as
suicide by cop as in the cases of Major Hassan or Sodini (the Pa Gym Killer). Do not
code depressive feelings here if they do not include direct references to suicidal
behavior, plans or fantasies. Code depression in Mental Health issues.
Signs of Planning of negative insider or related acts—discussion of materials,
equipment, steps needed, results, etc.
Rehearsal of negative insider or related acts or negative act practiced, approached,
or attempted without execution. For example, a shooter who brings his guns to the
organization planning to attack or a leaker who copies material but then does not
attack or send the information. An insider who rehearsed removing materials from
work by carrying out similar data or equipment.
Signs of deterioration in cognitive state, concentration, attention, self-control or
other mental functions.
Depersonalization of potential victims or targets—language suggesting
objectification, dehumanization of persons or groups making it easier to attack or
betray them.
Signs of diminishing inhibitions—references to negative behavior indicating an
increase in lack of judgment, control, vulnerability to impulsive actions versus a
decline in cognitive functions such as concentration and attention.
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Signs of perceived inability to pursue other options—references to path being
blocked, feeling no choice but insider acts.
Suspicion—the author expresses suspicion regarding others’ negative attitudes or
behavior toward him or those with whom he identifies without any specific
accusations, statements of victimization or blame. “I don’t trust Mike,” “Watch your
back around that guy,” “If it walks like a duck, talks like a duck…”
Accusations—the author identifies a specific individual or group as responsible for
his own or other identified persons’ mistreatment. “Jay made very sexist statements
(about me or our female employees).” “Mr. Smith you have no idea how much misery
you have caused employees.” Differs from Injustice Attribution which negatively
characterizes the organization or leadership for its behavior, policies or practices with
impact across the organization and its clients/customers, etc.
The author states that they feel specifically, directly and personally victimized, taken
advantage of, by persons or groups independent of whether these individuals or
groups are named. The passage may be scored for both accusations and victimization
if the author is specific in describing a direct action against him and an individual or
group to blame. “Bill’s unfair review has destroyed my chances of promotion this
year.” Differs from Injustice Attribution which negatively characterizes the
organization or leadership for its behavior, policies or practices with impact across
the organization and its clients/customers, etc. rather than a specific accusation of
victimization.
Rationalizing or Projective Blame—blame exaggerated or rationalized without
probable foundation to make the author feel better. Beyond a specific complaint the
author describes an individual or group as responsible for a global set of problems he
has encountered over time, reflecting an effort to externalize responsibility. “My
supervisor ruined my life and destroyed my marriage.” “You laying me off lead to
the death of my son.” “Your negative review two years ago ruined my entire career.”
General Injustice Attributions—Rather than a specific complaint about an
individual or group’s actions, injustice attributions impacting specific individuals or
groups reflect systemic problems with organizational procedures, values, enforcement
or leadership through specific actions or inactions. They involve specific reports of
events, procedures, actions or inactions that are reflective or organizational or
leadership problems rather than individual or small group behaviors. They differ from
Professional stressors or general unfairness at work. Includes specific complaints
about unjust decisions resulting from organizational leadership, policies or practices
impacting employees beyond the author (but may include him). Examples can include
a failure to respond to complaints or take action regarding a complaint. In other
examples, the Subject may believe:





wrongful behavior and unfair advantages or connections are systematically
rewarded (managers selling stock ahead of bad news);
lack of work is rewarded while hard work is not.
There is unequal versus equal treatment of employees.
There is equal or nondiscriminatory treatment when it should be
individualized and different.
66

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 8(1)





Good behavior or innocence is punished,
Punishment is displaced onto persons who either do not deserve it or do not
deserve the severity of the punishment.
The punishment is disproportionate to the act or intent.
Wrongful behavior goes unpunished and management makes arbitrary
rules.

Signs subject is obsessed with situation as manifested in repeated references or
complaints about the issue within or across communications, statements that the
subjects is constantly monitoring the situation, or primed to react to related events.
Signs of rationale for insider action or activity—“Everyone else is doing it,” “I was
instrumental in creating this information,” “It can’t be traced back to me,” “It makes
my life easier not to have to recreate this at my next job,” “They have it coming.”
“The organization is powerless to protect its interests and assets and therefore
deserves to be taken advantage of.”
Signs of mental health problems—include overt references to serious levels of
depression, anxiety or other mental health disorders or references to treatment,
referral for evaluation or other indicators of the existence of a mental health problem.
Do not infer the existence of a diagnosable mental health problem from implied or
direct references to less serious feelings or states. References to suicidal ideation,
plans, or attempts may also be coded.
Signs of personality issues associated with negative Actions (lack of conscience,
narcissism, psychopathy, social isolation or avoidance, entitlement, impulsiveness,
difficulties getting along with others, etc.)
References to previous violations of policies, practices, laws, accepted procedures.
References to social network risks in the form of contact, communication with or
relationship with persons and/or groups associated with adverse or competitive
intentions or actions against organization or personnel. References to family
members, social contacts or others involved in adversarial, illegal or anti-social acts.
Section 4. References to personal stressors directly impacting the author—do not
infer that something was stressful. Code specific references to events, circumstances
or perceived situations generally identified as stressful (death of spouse, new job,
move, divorce, break-up, etc.) or identified by the author as perceived so.
Section 5. References to professional stressors directly impacting the author—
do not infer that something was stressful. Code specific references to events,
circumstances or perceived situations identified as professionally stressful by the
author or generally accepted as stressful –failure to get a raise, promotion, a transfer,
demotion, layoffs at work, cuts in hours, benefits, etc.
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Section 6. Concerning Behaviors
References to Concerning Behaviors—recent violations of policy, practice, law,
Ethics, standards of interpersonal behavior, information security, finances, personnel
security, etc. while in current or past position. Different from previous violations
which occurred before recent employment. DWI as young adult might be Previous
Violation under personal predispositions while a recent DWI would be scored as a
Concerning Behavior.
References to unusual travel that could involve contacts with adversaries
Section 7. Inhibiting or Mitigating Factors (score negative points for each item,
subtracted from Insider risk score)
References to inhibiting religious or ethical beliefs or optimistic attitudes that could
inhibit insider actions. “I am young enough to start over.” “I’d love to get even but
that would mean being as nasty as he was.”
References to social support, dependents who could be impacted or act as inhibitors
of negative actions
References to successful treatment, counseling or other Inhibiting services or assets
(legal, financial, social)
References to concerns about possible insider action on career, reputation, effects
on others
References to use of sanctioned channels for complaint, protest such as a letter to
the CEO, writing a complaint within channels, filing a lawsuit, complaining to HR,
etc.
Qualitative Adjustment for Insider Risk in Author Not Captured Above—if you
feel that some aspect of the ratings do not capture the true level of insider risk
expressed in this author, add 1-10 points, with an explanation. For example, is the
author’s language intensely threatening within a very short passage. Or, does the
author go on producing a lengthy list of complaints that are not fully captured.
Alternatively, does the author’s score on one versus other categories raise significant
concerns, such as the presence of a significant mental health disorder (Paranoid
Schizophrenia with command hallucinations, Anti-social personality but without
known concerning behaviors or past offenses mentioned).

For complete copies of the SNIT and SIRDC as well as instructions, contact the
corresponding author.
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Table 3 Examples of High, Medium and Low Enron SNIT email excerpts by
score
Goup

High
(>30)

Medium
(16-30)

Email
SNIT
Score
42.3

“I’m so sad!!! I’m so depressed about the whole thing…He
feels like the bad guy. And I feel like a bad father!!!”

36.0

“Girl, remind me, just in case I have a memory lapse that I will
never, ever go back over to that church again…they’re fools…
I was so embarrassed that my chuckle came out!”

32.3

“Damnit Jeff. I don’t have time!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! The Panic is my
waste of time trying to get things organized. That’s the
panic…”

30.0

“Diomedes is going to jump all over me for even sending the
ESA memo to Metts. I told him that this message affects more
than us and he thinks he has free reign within this region… We
don’t want to come off looking dishonest to our own people.
And believe me, the rumors are out there… We would be
talking about half the international people that there is no
future for them. Whew!”

23.0

“No one seems sure if Bill is the acting originator for this
contract or not… Also I would appreciate receiving
clarification of why we don’t define the purchase amount as
the total and not just the balance remaining. It could create
discrepancies in the document… this seems inconsistent to
me… How is this possible?”

16.0

Low (115)

Email Excerpt

11.7

1.7

“Brad, I really don’t know where to begin other than just to
say it. Enron is having some extremely difficult times now…
this is not a good time for you or anyone else to try and seek
employment here. I am sorry if I’m letting you down. I was only
wanting to help. I will always keep you in mind, and hopefully
when things turn around here, I will be able to address you
coming here.”
“I wanted to call you at home, but I am never really sure when
you are sleeping and I don’t want to call and wake you up.
“As I see it, we really have not choice but to join this system if
we are going to participate in the JDG. Shortly they will stop
circulating work product, etc. via email and will rely upon this
website instead. The costs are somewhat unclear but it is
intended to be an economy of scale cost sharing concept.”

Table 4 Examples of High and Low SIRDC emails
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Group

SIRDC
Score

Email Excerpt

High
(≥9)

12.3

“Enron and you made millions out of the pocketbooks of
California’s consumers and from the efforts of your
employees… while you netted well over a $100 million, many of
Enron’s employees were financially devastated when the
company declared bankruptcy and then retirement plans were
wiped out… As a result, there are thousands of consumers who
are unable to pay their basic energy bills and the largest utility
in the state is bankrupt. The NY Times reported that you sold
$100 million worth of Enron stock while aggressively urging the
company’s employees to keep buying it. Please donate this
money to the funds set up to help repair the lives of those
Americans hurt by Enron’s under handed dealings.”

Low
(<9)

6.7

“Diomedes is going to jump all over me for even sending the
ESA memo to Metts. I told him that this message affects more
than us and he thinks he has free reign within this region… We
don’t want to come off looking dishonest to our own people. And
believe me, the rumors are out there… We would be talking
about half the international people that there is no future for
them. Whew!”

4.7

“Yes, unfortunately, we aren’t going to get ours until the 5th. No
explanation was given. We may get the numbers a day or so
ahead of time but I haven’t gotten them yet.”

2.7

”I question whether we should ask Capt. Sawant to put anything
in writing concerning how to beef up his second report until we
talk further… I am concerned that anything he puts in writing
may be discoverable in a U.K. arbitration proceeding....”
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Table 5 Stalker email excerpts by SNIT and SIRDC scores
Email #

Email Excerpt

SNIT
Scores

SIRDC
Score

Email 3

Who would ever be attracted to you. And you
think you are going to get a banker. All you are
going to get is an asshole who will treat you like
the ugly slut that you are. And the funny thing
is that you probably think you're cute. Well
honey, you're far far from it.

32.4

8.7

Email 12 (Just
prior to attack)

No, we did not forget about you. You are next
bitch!

51.5

44.5

Email 17

From one bitch to another, you can wear all the
black pants and black outfits that you want, it
still doesn't hide your fat ass… nothing can hide
the fact that you have absolutely NO tits… And
please, don't ever decide to have children.

37.3

16.5
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